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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The free dissolution, both voluntary and involuntary, of modern cor-
porations should not defeat their suability in other sovereign states.5
3
The analogy of dissolution to natural death in its old aspect is fallacious,
in that it carries forward the common law conception of evaporation of
the corporation, whereas today there are shareholders, assets, and suc-
cessors to wind up its affairs and they should answer to suits brought
in the corporate name. The corporate entity does not extend beyond
the borders of its creating state until another state admits it, and when
so admitted, some new sort of entity is reincorporated which should not
be said to "die" when the other state dissolves that which it created. 4
The local forum can subscribe to pro rata distribution of assets and still
protect local creditors by giving them their share out of local assets,
and thus not force them to go to the creating jurisdiction with their
claim.55 Corporations should no longer be able to defeat civil and
criminal actions brought against them by working a dissolution in the
creating state, only to reappear the next day in identical form with a
new charter. 56 With the present ability of corporations to shop for the
most advantageous state corporation law, the only other real solution
would be the drastic legislation already introduced in Coilgress requiring
a federal charter for all corporations engaging in interstate commerce. 5T
EDWARD B. Hipp.
Corporations-Taxation-Status of Payments to Hybrid
Security Holders
It often becomes necessary for a court to determine whether certain
hybrid securities are in fact stocks or bonds.1 This determination is
frequently essential in order to ascertain whether periodic payments by
a corporation to the holders of its securities should be classified as
interest on indebtedness, which is deductable from gross income for
income tax purposes, 2 or as dividends to stockholders, which are not
"
3See note 3 supra.5 4 HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 278 and 313 (1923).
Notes, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 306 (1947), 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 283 (1936).
' See note 3 mspra.
" U. S. News & World Report, Oct. 14, 1949, p. 30. Cf. English Companies
Act (1929) §338(2) (providing that foreign corporations be wound up as un-
registered companies despite dissolution by the creating state).
1 The distinction between these securities must in many cases be ascertained
in order for the court to establish the priority between a certificate holder and
general unsecured or subsequent secured creditors of the corporation. Warren v.
King, 108 U. S. 389 (1883) (foreclosure proceeding) ; Mathews v. Bradford, 70
F. 2d 77 (6th Cir. 1934) (receivership proceeding); Spencer v. Smith, 201 Fed.
647 (8th Cir. 1912) (bankruptcy proceeding); Phoenix Hotel Co., 13 F. Supp.
229 (E. D. Ky. 1935) (reorganization proceeding).
2 INT. REv. CODE §23. "In computing net income there shall be allowed as
deductions: (b) Interest.-All interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on




In the recent case of Bowersock Mills and Power Company v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue,4 the court was faced with this issue. In
that case, a closely held corporation, 5 so that it might be in a position
to obtain bank credit, issued preferred stock to its bondholders (the
Bowersock Trust, hereinafter referred to as the Trust) in payment of
the bonds with accrued interest. The Trust further agreed to release
the first deed of Trust on the corporation's assets. The above-mentioned
stock was to be preferred both as to dividends and as to assets; bear
cumulative dividends of three per cent payable annually if the net earn-
ings at the time should be sufficient to pay such dividends; carry voting
rights equal to those carried by common st6ck in the case of sale, mort-
gage or pledge of the fixed assets of the corporation and in case of
other fundamental changes in the corporation; be retirable at par plus
accrued dividends on call of the corporation; provided that if any divi-
dends in excess of three per cent were declared on the common in any
year, one half of such excess was to be paid on the preferred stock as
an additional dividend.
Simultaneously with the issuance of the stock, the common stock-
holders entered into a contract with the Trust whereby the common
stockholders agreed to buy and the Trust to sell the preferred stock, a
certain number of shares per year, provided the corporation had not
redeemed that amount within the prescribed period. To insure pay-
ment of the dividends and repurchase of the preferred stock, the com-
mon stockholders agreed to put their stock in trust, on condition that
in the event of default of the corporation on the dividends for a period
of six months, or the failure of the common stockholders to cause the
corporation to purchase the stock as provided in the contract, the com-
mon stock would be transferred to the Bowersock Trust as liquidated
damages.
The majority opinion of the court held that inasmuch as the cor-
poration was closely held, considering the two contracts together was
obligatory. By so doing, it became evident that the real intention of the
parties was merely to change the form of the indebtedness, thereby
subordinating it to bank credit, and that the parties intended to and did
retain a debtor-creditor relationship. Following this reasoning, the court
held that the payments fell into the category bf interest and were there-
fore deductable.
gations (other than obligations of the United States issued after September 24,
1917, and originally subscribed for by the taxpayer) the interest upon which is
wholly exempt from the taxes imposed by this chapter."
14 MERTENs, LAW oF FEDERAL INcomE TAXATioN §26.10 (1942).
'172 F. 2d 904 (10th Cir. 1949).
'All of the outstanding stock was held by one family.
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The dissenting judge felt that the contract between the corporation
and the Trust clearly created a shareholder relationship and that the
second contract did not alter this relation, as that contract was solely
between the common stockholders and the Trust.
A persuasive argument is advanced by the majority in that it is
more realistic to disregard the corporate entity in the case of a closely
held corporation. It is recognized that in a proper case it is equitable
to look behind the corporate entity,6 but it is submitted that this is not
such a case. The corporation neither assumed any liabilities nor ob-
tained any benefits under the contract between the common stockholders
and the Trust. Furthermore, the corporation and its stockholders are
taxed separately and it would, therefore, seem more logical to consider
only the contract between the corporation and the Trust in determining
the tax liability of the corporation.
Furthermore, there is authority in support of the proposition that
where the payment of dividends on, or the redemption of, preferred
stock is guaranteed by one other than the issuing corporation, the under-
takings are separate and the stockholder relationship does not become a
creditor relationship. 7  Some cases so hold even where the issuing cor-
poration guarantees the payment of the periodic dividends.8
In deciding whether the payments are interest or dividends, the
"traditonal approach" is to consider the factors indicating a shareholder
relationship and those indicating a debtor-creditor relationship and to
conclude that the security more nearly resembles, and therefore should
for all purposes be treated as bonds or as stocks.9
Evaluation of the weight assigned by the courts to each indi-
vidual factor is difficult. Occasionally a particular element is pro-
nounced decisive, but more often a combination of the elements present
in the case sways the judgment. The determining factors are usually
listed as: the name given to the certificates ;1o the presence or absence
' As was stated by Judge Sanborn in United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator
Co., 142 Fed. 247, 255 (7th Cir. 1905) "A corporation will be looked upon as a
legal entity as a general rule, and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears;
but, when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an
association of persons."
Hazel Atlas Glass Co. v. Van Dyke and Reeves, 8 F. 2d 716 (2d Cir. 1925),
cert. denied sub norn Van Dyke v. Young, 269 U. S. 570 (1925) (guaranteed by
Ellis and Reeves, principal stockholders) ; Northern Refrigerator Lines, Inc. v.
Commission of Internal Revenue, 1 T. C. 824 (1943) (guaranteed by another cor-
poration holding the common stock) ; McCoy-Garten Realty Co., 14 B. T. A. 853(1928). See note 88 A. L. R. 1131, 1143 (1934) and cases cited.
' Leasehold Realty Co., 3 B. T. A. 1129 (1926); see 1 MACHEN, MODERN LAW
OF CORPORATIONS §542 (1908) where it is pointed out that "courts construe such a
guaranty to apply only to payment out of funds legally available for dividends."
94 M1fERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §26.10 (1942). A recent case
following this approach is Jordan Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 5
C. C. H. 1949 Fed. Tax Rep. 19372 (D. C. 1949).
" The courts vary as to the amount of weight they will give to the name of
[Vol. 28
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of a definite maturity date with a right to enforce the payment of prin-
cipal and interest ;11 status equal to or inferior to that of regular cor-
porate creditors ;12 the presence or absence of voting rights ;13 the right
to participate in dividends after common stock has received a percentage
equal to preferred ;14 the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the
certificates ;15 and the intention of the parties.16
The majority of the court in the principal case did not specifically
follow the "traditional approach," but they did appear to make the fac-
tors of intention and circumstances surrounding the issuance of the
certificates controlling.17
It is submitted that it would be better not to follow the "traditional
approach" of balancing the provisions of the security as a whole and
discovering whether the security more nearly resembles bonds or shares
the security. Some cases appear to give it little; see Jewel Tea Co. v. United
States, 90 F. 2d 451 (2d Cir. 1937), while others appear to give it considerable
weight. Mathews v. Bradford, 70 F. 2d 77 (6th Cir. 1934) ("intention to create
debt must be clear and convincir;g. where called stock"); Spencer v. Smith, 201
Fed. 647 (8th Cir. 1912) ; Leasehold Realty Co., supra note 8.
There are certain cases in which the corporation should be estopped to deny
that the certificate is something other than the name given it. E.g., creditors may
have extended credit relying on the fact that outstanding securities labeled pre-
ferred stock were stock and not bonds and that the holders therefore had a claim
on the corporate assets inferior to his claim. Cf. Gallatin Farmers Co. v. Com-
missioner of Iternal Revenue, 132 F. 2d 706 (9th Cir. 1942) ; 1 MACHEN, MODERN
LAW OF CORPORATIONS §547 (1908).
It is submitted that the courts could follow, in tax cases, the rule that the cor-
poration was aware of the taxable consequences of the label placed on the certif-
icates and that it should be bound by its election except in cases where the form
used was obviously fictitious on its face. This rule would have the advantage
of facilitating the disposition of the cases without allowing a corporation to evade
taxes by giving the security an artificial name.
"Finance and Investment Corp. v. Burnet, 57 F. 2d 444 (App. D. C. 1932).
Some cases treat this factor as the most important. As was stated in United
States v. South Ga. Ry., 107 F. 2d 3, 5 (5th Cir. 1939) "There is, thus, an entire
absence here of the most significant, if not the essential feature of a debtor and
creditor and opposed to a stockholder relationship, the existence of a fixed maturity
for the principal with the right to force payment of the sum as a debt in the event
of default."
'u Helvering v. Richmond, F. and P. Ry., 90 F. 2d 971 (4th Cir. 1937).
x' This factor seems to be frequently discussed but seldom given much weight.
Although the voting privilege is usually extended only to shareholders, preferred
stock is often issued with an express provision that it is to have no voting rights.
11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS, §5301 (perm. ed. 1931).
"See Cass v. Realty Securities Co., 148 App. Div. 96, 132 N. Y. Supp. 1074
(1941).
" See Miller v. Ratterman, 47 Ohio St. 141, 24 N. E. 496 (1890) (certificates
were issued under a statute which authorized issuance of preferred stock but not
certificates of indebtness. Therefore, held to be certificates of preferred stock
even though contained many elements of indebtness).
1" Schmoll Fits Associated v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 39 B. T. A.
411 (1939).
1 Had the court, in the principal case, held that the two contracts were separate,
the securities would clearly have been stocks under the traditional approach. They
were called preferred stock; dividends were payable only out of earnings; they
had no fixed maturity date; they carried voting rights for certain purposes; and
they were to an extent participating-all of which are characteristics of stocks
rather than bonds.
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of stock with a view to imposing all the legal consequences generally
associated with the particular label given the security. This approach
may cause a decision to rest on considerations not necessarily relevant
to the question before the court. E.g., in the principal case the factors
of intention and circumstances surrounding the issuance of the certif-
icates do not seem to be necessarily relevant in determining whether or
not the periodic payments are a definite and fixed obligation on the part
of the corporation regardless of earnings.
It would appear to be a sounder approach to limit the inquiry to the
characteristics of the security material to the particular question before
the court and cause the judgment to depend not on the entire complex
of attributes but on those aspects determined to be pertinent to the par-
ticular issue under consideration.
Under this analysis the court, in cases involving the taxability of
periodic payments made by a corporation to its security holders and
guaranteed by a third party, could narrow the issue to: Are these pay-
ments a definite obligation of the corporation regardless of earnings?
The guaranty by the third party should be disregarded in that the cor-
poration and the third party are taxed individually and only the tax
liability of the corporation is involved.
RODDEY M. LiGON, JR.
Courts-Venue-Inconvenient Forum Considerations and Special
Venue Provisions Under the New Judicial Code*
The new Judicial Code," effective September 1, 1948, gave the fed-
eral courts in §1404(a) 2 the power to transfer a civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought if necessary for
the convenience of witnesses and in the interest of justice. Prior to
this revised code, there was no provision in the federal statutes for the
transfer of venue from one district to another district; but where more
than one venue was available to a plaintiff, the federal courts could exer-
cise the equitable right to dismiss a case without prejudice and thus
force the plaintiff to sue over again somewhere else.3 Both before and
after final approval of §1404(a), there was speculation by writers as
to the effect of this new power on actions arising under special venue
* For some interesting discussions of other problems presented by §1404 (a), see
Mangan, Federal Legislation, 37 GEo. L. J. 394, 400 (1949) ; Marcus, The Supreme
Court and the Antitrust Laws, 37 GEo. L. J. 341, 356 (1949) ; Notes, 60 HAV. L.
REv. 424 (1947), 23 IND. L. J. 82 (1947) ; and materials listed in footnote 4 infra.
Title 28 U. S. C. C. S.
"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought."
'Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501 (1947) ; Koster v. Lumbermen's
Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518 (1947); Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288
U. S. 123, 130-131 (1932).
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